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AGAINST AD HOCERY: A COMMENT ON MICHELMAN
Susan Rose-Ackerman*
Frank Michelman believes that the Supreme Court is "moving no-
ticeably towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings doctrine."' He
criticizes this development, believing that the Court should instead en-
gage in balancing. To him "balancing-or, better, the judicial practice
of situated judgment or practical reason-is not law's antithesis but a
part of law's essence."' 2 I argue in this Article that Michelman is wrong
on both counts. Part I demonstrates that the Court does not appear to
be articulating consistent formal principles in the takings area. Part II
argues that it should try to do just that. Whatever the merits of ad hoc
balancing in other areas of law, it has special difficulties in the takings
area because of the important role of investment-backed expectations.
Nonetheless, Michelman is correct in saying that the formal pattern he
discerns is an undesirable one.8 Thus, Part III suggests a way to think
about the takings question that unifies physical and regulatory takings
and provides a way to distinguish between government actions that re-
quire compensation and those that do not. Nevertheless, even a very
imperfect, but clearly articulated, formal takings doctrine is likely to be
superior to open-ended balancing.
I. MICHELMAN AND THE STATE OF TAKINGS LAW
Michelman purports to discover a pattern by examining four regu-
latory takings cases decided in the 1987 Term.4 At first glance, these
cases seem an unlikely place to look for orderly doctrinal development.
Contrary to the usual pattern in regulatory takings cases, the plaintiffs
* Ely Professor of Law and Political Economy, Yale Law School and Department of
Political Science. Ph.D. 1970, Yale University.
Originally prepared for the Conference on Regulatory Takings, Dartmouth College,
Hanover, N.H., February 26-27, 1988. I wish to thank Bruce Ackerman, Robert
Ellickson, William Fischel and Henry Hansmann for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
1. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1622 (1988).
2. Id. at 1629.
3. To Michelman, takings doctrine
appears to be [resolving itself] into a series of categorical "either-ors": either
(a) the regulation is categorically a taking of property because (i) it works a
permanent physical occupation (however practically trivial) of private property
by the government... or (ii) it totally eliminates the property's economic value
or "viability" to its nominal owner, or (b) the regulation is categorically not a
taking.
Id. at 1622 (footnotes omitted).
4. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Hodel v.
Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 1)7 S.
Ct. 1232 (1987). HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1697 1988
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won in three of the four cases, and in the fourth, Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis,5 the decision was five to four. Furthermore,
Keystone involved a statute very similar to the one invalidated in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,6 the one early case in which a regulatory
taking was found. The four cases produced multiple opinions, and all
but Hodel v. Irving7 produced sharp dissents. Only Justice White was
with the majority in all four cases although in Hodel he joined another
Justice's concurrence. In short, the Court hardly seems to have united
behind a single view of the takings clause.
This conclusion is confirmed by examining the one regulatory tak-
ings case decided in the 1988 term, Pennell v. City of San Jose.8 The
Court achieved a seven-Justice majority by refusing to rule on whether
a taking had occurred in the absence of a concrete example of harm. 9
The two Justices writing in partial dissent would have reached the mer-
its and found a taking. 10
Michelman is able to discern a simple pattern emerging from re-
cent takings cases because he is at pains to give a narrow interpretation
to the two decisions that have the most potential for a broadened view
of the takings clause. Thus, he argues that Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission 1" should be understood "as a further manifestation, albeit in
somewhat surprising form, of the talismanic force of 'permanent physi-
cal occupation' in takings adjudication." 1 2 Similarly, his reading of First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 13 is designed
to give that opinion limited scope. Under his analysis, "all [that the
Court] there decided, was that... the state must compensate the land-
owner in money for [the] interim of compelled compliance with [an]
unconstitutional regulation."' 14 For Michelman, the key to the finding
of a time-limited taking in First English is "that the enacters of the of-
fending regulation enacted it not as temporary but as indefinite."' 5
Michelman may be correct in the sense that his reading of these cases
was required to produce majority support for the finding of a taking in
each case. That inference, however, is a far cry from Michelman's
stronger claim that these decisions signal a reformalization of takings
law. An alternative explanation, supported by the shifting makeup of
the majorities in the recent cases, is that the future direction of takings
law is very much in doubt. The Court has left itself free to move in any
5. 107 S. Ct. 1232.
6. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
7. 107 S. Ct. 2076.
8. 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988).
9. Id. at 856-57.
10. Id. at 859 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
12. Michelman, supra note 1, at 1608.
• 3. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
Michelman, supra note 1, at 1617.
15. Id. at 1619.
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number of directions in the future without having explicitly to overrule
any of these cases.
As a general matter, Michelman argues that, after Pennsylvania
Coal 16 was decided in 1922, the Court moved "toward a highly
nonformal, open-ended, multi-factor balancing method."'17 He claims
that in recent years the Court has felt "unease about the lack of defini-
tion and rigor of its regulatory-takings doctrine."'18 While Michelman's
view of the trend appears to be correct, I think he is wrong about the
unease. Instead, the Court seems to be inordinately proud of the ad
hoc nature of its takings opinions and has reiterated its support of case-
by-case balancing in the current crop of opinions. Thus, Justice
Stevens in Keystone cited with approval the statement in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States that:
this court has generally "been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compen-
sated by the government, rather than remain disproportion-
ately concentrated on a few persons." Rather, it has examined
the "taking" question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, fac-
tual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with rea-
sonable investment backed expectations, and the character of
the government action-that have particular significance.19
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Keystone, found nothing to disa-
gree with here: "Admittedly, questions arising under the Just Compen-
sation Clause rest on ad hoc factual inquiries, and must be. decided on
the facts and circumstances in each case." 20 The only exception oc-
cured in the partial dissent in Pennell written by Justice Scalia and joined
by Justice O'Connor.2 1
In short, my view of the recent cases is the reverse of Professor
16. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
17. Michelman, supra note 1, at 1621 (citation omitted).
18. Id. at 1622 (citation omitted).
19. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), quoted in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247 (1987) (citations omit-
ted). Actually, Stevens is quoting from Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981), which quoted Kaiser Aetna. The internal quotation
in Kaiser Aetna is from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978). The Court repeated the "essentially ad hoc factual inquir[y]" language in Pen-
nell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 856 (1988).
20. 107 S. Ct. at 1254. Similar language is found in Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). "There is no abstract or fixed point at
which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas
and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. Resolution of each case, how-
ever, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of
logic." Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
21. Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 860-61 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (ad hoc factual inquiry inappropriate when challenge is to a law in all its
applications).
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Michelman's. The recent cases represent a continuation of the trend
toward ad hoc balancing, but what takings law needs is a good dose of
formalization.
II. THE PERILS OF CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS
The Court's (and Michelman's) glorification of ad hoc balancing is
impossible to reconcile with a belief in the importance of preserving
"investment-backed expectation[s]. '"22 Takings law should be predict-
able, on this view, so that private individuals confidently can commit
resources to capital projects. 23 Nevertheless, as many economically ori-
ented writers have argued, no taking can legitimately be claimed if the
property owner correctly anticipated that an uncompensated state ac-
tion was possible and if this belief affected the price paid for the asset. 24
If takings jurisprudence is both ad hoc and ex post, however, investors
may have a very difficult time knowing whether a particular predictable
state action will or will not be judged to be a taking. Therefore, even if
the menu of possible state actions is known and probabilities can be
assigned to each policy, investors will not be able to make informed
choices because the Court has not provided clear standards to deter-
mine when compensation will be paid.25 The shifting doctrines of tak-
ings law introduce an element of uncertainty into investors' choices that
has nothing to do with the underlying economics of the situation. This
uncertainty creates two problems. First, investors do not know whether
or not damages will be paid. Second,* in the event damages are not
paid, investors will be left bearing the costs of an uninsurable risk.
Thus, the Justices need to recognize that the investment-backed expec-
tations they discuss are themselves affected by the nature of takings law.
To the extent that investors are risk averse, the very incoherence of the
doctrine produces inefficient choices. When legal rules affect behavior,
clarity is a value in itself, independent of the actual content of the rule.
The problem ofjudicially created uncertainty is exacerbated by the
ex post nature of court decisions. Judges are reluctant to decide cases
until someone has "actually" been harmed. Not only are they reluctant
to articulate general principles of takings law, but judges are also un-
willing to make general rulings on the status of state actions under indi-
vidual statutes. Thus, in Keystone, Justice Stevens, in discussing
22. This phrase comes from Michelman. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv.
L. Rev. 1165, 1233 (1967).
23. Id. at 1216-17.
24. See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analy-
sis, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 569, 584-87 (1984). Michelman also recognizes this point.
Michelman, supra note 22, at 1238.
25. See Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1;'30 n.81.
Epstein's own proposed reformulation of takings doctrine is, I believe, unsatisfactory.
See infra note 66.
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, dismissed Justice Holmes's analysis of
the general validity of the act as an uncharacteristic "advisory opin-
ion." 26 Stevens then went on to argue that no taking had occurred
under the similar Pennsylvania law at issue in Keystone because at the
time of the lawsuit no company could demonstrate that it actually had
been harmed. The companies were asking the Court to pass on the
general legitimacy of the statute, and this the majority declined to do.27
Similarly, in Pennell an association of landlords was given standing to
challenge a portion of SanJose's rent control ordinance, but their claim
that a taking had occurred was dismissed as "premature" because no
landlord had actually suffered harm from the disputed provision.28
Thus, in the field of regulatory takings, where the future direction of
the law is unclear, economic actors cannot obtain a prospective ruling
from a court on whether a particular law will effect a taking. They must
wait until a concrete harm has occurred before the statute can be
tested. In the face of this uncertainty, investors may forgo otherwise
profitable activities, and thus, the current state of the law may produce
an inefficiently low level of investment.
Investors are not the only ones adversely affected by the incoher-
ence and unpredictability of takings law. Government officials may be
affected as well since the vagueness of the doctrine riiay act as a force
for conservatism among public officials. Risk averse officials facing the
possibility of damage suits against their jurisdictions may restrict their
activities simply because they dislike uncertainty. 29 As Justice Stevens
noted in his dissent in First English-
It is no answer to say that "[a]fter all, if a policeman must
know the Constitution, then why not a planner?" To begin
with, the Court has repeatedly recognized that it itself cannot
establish any objective rules to assess when a regulation be-
comes a, taking. How then can it demand that land' planners
do any better?30
As the Court moves to reconsider the regulatory takings area, it
appears to be developing a jurisprudence that is working against, what
is to me, the fundamental goal of the takings clause. The clause is an
26. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. IeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1241 (1987)
(citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922)).
27. Rehnquist, in dissent, would have been willing to do this. He argued that in
Pennsylvania Coal the general validity of the act "was properly drawn into question." 107
S. Ct. at 1254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
28. Pennell v. City of SanJose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 854-56 (1988). The partial dissent,
in contrast, would-have reached the merits of the takings claim. Id. at 860-61 (ScaliaJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. An expansive regulatory takings doctrine may also discourage government reg-
ulation. That result may or may not be desirable depending upon one's view of the costs
imposed on property owners by regulations.
30. 107 S. Ct. at 2399 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 (1981) (Brennan,J., dissenting)) (citations
omitted).
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attempt to reconcile an unpredictable, democratically responsible pol-
ity with the existence of a capitalist economy based on private property
and individual initiative. 3' The ad hoc nature of the law introduces an
element of uncertainty into private investment decisions that could
make the coexistence of democracy and private property more, rather
than less, difficult.
III. TOWARD A TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Let us move now from criticism to prescription. If the courts did
try to make sense of the takings issue as a general matter, what should
they say? The answer has both an efficiency and an equity component.
The efficiency analysis of the takings issue stresses its impact on both
private and public investment and on the distribution of risk in society.
Takings law also plays a role in enhancing political legitimacy and con-
tributing to the fairness of the distribution of wealth.
The distinction between physical and regulatory takings is not
meaningful in efficiency terms, and it also has little to recommend it
under most ethical theories. Although this distinction retains a hold on
the legal mind, 32 the takings jurisprudence outlined below does not be-
gin with this dichotomy as a first principle. The analysis instead pro-
vides a general overview of the takings issue.
A. Efficiency
To begin, one must distinguish between efficient and inefficient
compensated takings. The efficiency question has three prongs: (1) the
possibility of over- or underinvestment by private individuals (the "pri-
vate-investment" issue); (2) the problem of government-created uncer-
tainty (the "insurance" issue); and (3) the impact of takings doctrine on
the decisions of public officials (the "public-investment" issue).
The private-investment issue concentrates upon the use the gov-
ernment intends to make of the property. It distinguishes between im-
provements to property that the government will use and
improvements that it will destroy. On this first efficiency ground, only
the former should be completely compensated. Thus, a homeowner
should be compensated both when the state takes his home to turn it
into a tourist attraction and when the state passes a regulation requir-
ing the homeowner to permit public access to her garden one month a
year. Full compensation in other cases generally will be inefficient be-
cause it will produce overinvestment. If people expect to be fully com-
pensated for a public policy that destroys their property, they will invest
31. Compare the similar position of the writers cited infra note 46.
32. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U:S. 419, 426
( 982). For a discussion of why thislmight be the case, see B. Ackerman, Private Prop-
erty and the Constitution 113-67 (1977).
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too much in the property.33 Thus, a homeowner should not be fully
compensated for the value of a house that is destroyed to make way for
a highway.
Under such a compensation system, when the state destroys ex-
isting investments, homeowners will behave efficiently when compensa-
tion is set between zero and the level of investment that would be
efficient in the absence of any compensation for the taking. Leaving
aside the insurance issue, a level of compensation above zero would be
required on efficiency grounds only if courts wished to force govern-
ments to take into account the opportunity costs of their actions.34 In
such cases, courts would need to judge the efficient level of homeowner
investment ex ante given the possibility of future governmental use.
Notice that under this first theory, the compensation decision
would depend only on the government's use of the property. This
compensation policy is designed solely to produce optimal investment
decisions by private owners. Both the economic status of the owner
and the magnitude of the loss would be irrelevant. Therefore, owners
should be compensated for any land-use regulation, such as an histori-
cal-preservation ordinance, when public benefits flow from past invest-
ment spending by individuals. Unfortunately, in practice, the
probability of compensation is highest in just those areas in which over-
reliance is most likely. If the state destroys a "thing," it usually will be
required to pay for it.s5 In contrast, if it merely uses assets without
taking title to them, by, for example, requiring the owner to comply
with historical-preservation standards, the state generally will not be
required to compensate her.36 This gives owners of buildings that
might in the future be declared landmarks an incentive to tear them
down quickly so that the issue will not arise.37 Thus, legal doctrine in
this area illustrates clearly the conflict between "scientific policymak-
ing" and "ordinary observing" isolated in Bruce Ackerman's study of
takings doctrine.38 Economic analysis suggests a rule that is directly
33. For fuller discussions of the issue of overinvestment, see Blume & Rubinfeld,
supra note 24, at 618-20; Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When
Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 QJ. Econ. 71 (1984). As Blume and Rubinfeld ar-
gue: "Whatever the exact determination of compensation, it is important that the mea-
sure be one that cannot be directly affected by the behavior of the individual investors,
since any compensation measure which can be affected by private behavior will create
the possibility of inefficiency due to moral hazard." Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 24,
at 618 n.144.
34. Cf. Fischel & Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Eco-
nomic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17J. Legal Stud. 269 (1988) (ana-
lyzing situations in which government actions produce demoralization costs).
35. See the critical analysis of this doctrine in B. Ackerman, supra note 32, at
130-36.
36. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. Cf. W. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws 174 (1985) (giving an example).
38. B. Ackerman, supra note 32, at 10-15.
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opposed to the idea that government should only pay for things that it
physically appropriates.
A compensation rule designed to limit overreliance would have the
hypothesized behavioral consequences, however, only if government
actions are reasonably predictable so that investors can base their deci-
sions on informed predictions about what the government will do in
the future. Thus, the compensation rule proposed above should, in
principle, be supplemented with a public policy of announcing public
actions in advance and by stating at the same time that compensation
will be paid only to those in possession of the property at the time of
the announcement. Subsequent sales contracts would be required to
include clauses explaining the future government action.
A requirement that governments announce their actions in ad-
vance, however, while fine in principle, misconceives the nature of most
political processes. At any point in time a wide range of public policies
is possible. Some may be enacted this year, some next year arid others
never. Thus, few policies will be wholly unexpected, and none will be
completely certain. Nevertheless, takings law should require property
owners to make informed guesses3 9 and should encourage govern-
ments to be as specific as possible about their plans. A rule tying com-
pensation to the date a project is announced would further this goal.
Given the uncertainty that is, I believe, an inherent feature of rep-
resentative democratic government, the insurance branch of the effi-
ciency analysis becomes of critical importance. The problem of risk
spreading, unlike the issue of overinvestment, is tied to the situation of
the private owner, independent of the government's use of the prop-
erty. Because of its contrasting focus, this second efficiency concern
produces results that will sometimes conflict with the first. Conflicts
can be resolved by deciding whether government is best viewed as a
well-organized process with known probabilities attached to possible
future actions or as an essentially random and unpredictable enter-
prise, at least in its impact on particular persons. When the latter view
is closest to being correct, compensation may be justified because it
acts as a form of insurance. Even if the state is certain to carry out a
particular policy, such as building a highway, no one may be able to
predict who will be affected adversely, that is, which route will be cho-
sen. If the ex ante probability of being harmed is distributed broadly
across the population and if no compensation is paid, two different re-
39. For example, in Chang v. United States, 13 CI. Ct. 555 (1987), the Claims Court
denied compensation to engineers whose employment contracts in Libya had been
voided by an Executive Order issued by President Reagan. The court argued that "the
risk that employment in Libya might be interrupted by tension in the relations between
that government and the United States can hardly be said to have been outside the rea-
sonable contemplation of plaintiffs at the time they entered into their employment con-
tracts." Id. at 560. Furthermore, the engineers should have reasonably supposed that
economic sanctions against Libya were possible.
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suits are possible. On the one hand, if people are risk neutral, they will
rationally cut back their investment just enough to compensate for the
risk of expropriation. On the other hand, if people are risk averse, the
uncertainty created by the threat of harm may lead them to underinvest
and to hold their assets in a form that is unlikely to be affected by the
public program.
Underinvestment would not occur if insurance were available, but
the risks discussed here are generally uninsurable in the private market
because of both the arbitrary incidence of harm and the problems .of
moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when the
existence of insurance leads the insured person to take actions that in-
crease the probability or the magnitude of the loss. In this context, it
occurs if property owners secretly lobby to have their property taken or
at least do not actively oppose a policy that will produce that result.
Although such lobbying is possible when the government pays compen-
sation itself, the obvious budgetary consequences of such behavior will
help to check abuses. Adverse selection occurs if insurance companies
cannot adequately sort property owners into risk classes. In such a case
high-risk and low-risk owners are charged the same rate so that very
low-risk owners may decide to self-insure. The remaining pool of in-
sured owners is thus riskier and premiums must rise. Now the remain-
ing low-risk owners may opt out of the pool. If the insurance
companies have less information about risks than property owners,
profitable insurance contracts may be impossible to write.40
Therefore, when government creates risks for which private insur-
ance is unavailable, efficient risk distribution provides an economically
oriented reason for basing the compensation decision on the magni-
tude of the harm suffered. In considering the degree of harm, courts
must decide which standard of comparison to use. For example, should
they define the plaintiff's property as the coal that cannot be mined
because of the regulatory statute, so that 100 percent of it has been
taken, or as the firm's entire mining operation, so that only a small
share has been lost?4 1 A generally accepted rule of thumb is that indi-
viduals behave in a risk averse way when a major portion of their total
wealth is threatened. Since owner-occupied housing represents a large
proportion of most owners' personal wealth, government should com-
pensate homeowners when it takes their houses either through physical
confiscation or through a regulation that makes them uninhabitable. 42
Conversely, if it confiscates their toasters or passes an ordinance mak-
ing them unusable, no compensation would need to be paid on risk-
spreading grounds. In short, the standard of comparison should be the
individual's total wealth, not just the property "affected" by the taking.
In contrast, broadly held corporations should be viewed as risk neutral,
40. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 24, at 584-99.
41. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
42. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 24, at 606-10.
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even toward large losses, because shareholders and other investors can
insure by holding a diversified portfolio of investments. Compensation
might, however, be provided to employees and owners of specialized
assets if either group will suffer large declines in permanent income or
wealth relative to their expectations in the absence of the public pro-
gram. The courts should develop some simple rules of thumb that,
although not perfectly adapted to all the individual situations that arise,
will nevertheless provide insurance protection to most of those who
would demand it.
The final element in an efficiency analysis concerns the impact of
takings law on the calculations of public officials. The compensation
requirement can be understood as a way to force public policymakers
to consider the opportunity costs of their proposed actions. Policies
that "take" private property would then have concrete budgetary im-
pacts that would be immediately reflected in tax bills or borrowing ca-
pacity. The efficiency consequences of a comprehensive compensation
requirement depend upon one's view of the way government policy is
made. If cost-benefit tests are used, actual compensation is not re-
quired since the analyst can be expected to take into account all costs
and benefits, not just those that show up in the budget. Efficient tak-
ings rules can depend entirely upon the impact of compensation on the
behavior of private individuals. Conversely, if decision makers are im-
perfect agents of the public, compensation requirements may have little
impact on their choices because the required payments come from tax-
payers, not from the decision makers' own pockets. Once again, but for
very different reasons, takings rules can depend upon their impact on
private individuals. Finally, if public choices are the result of the com-
petition of various groups for political benefits, powerful groups will
not need a constitutionally mandated takings doctrine in order to pre-
serve their interests. They will be able to insist that the overall legisla-
tive package be beneficial to them. Left out of this account, however,
are politically ineffective individuals severely harmed by some public
policy. Efficiency requires that their costs be taken into account; yet the
operation of the political process may not incorporate these costs.
Under this view of the political system, compensation should be paid
for these losses to force politicians to recognize their existence.
Since government policymaking can at least sometimes be charac-
terized as a struggle between organized groups, 43 takings law should
consider whether the affected individuals suffer special difficulties in
having their interests taken seriously by the political process. The tak-
ings clause, however, is unlikely to be an effective means of equalizing
the power of various population groups. It can be most effective as a
43. See, e.g., K. Schlozman & J. Tierney, Organized Interests and American De-
mocracy (1986); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
Econ. 211 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulafion, 2 BellJ. Eton. & Mgmt.
Sci. 3 (1971).
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way to protect the property interests of unorganized individuals with
nothing in common except that they would otherwise bear the costs of
some public policy.4 4
Thus, an efficient takings doctrine should not be concerned pri-
marily with the impact of the doctrine on the calculations of public offi-
cials. Instead, except for special claims advanced by the politically
weak, the emphasis should be on encouraging efficient actions by pri-
vate property owners. This perspective produces the following rough
guide to deciding cases. Always compensate for property that the gov-
ernment will use in the form in which it is provided by the owner. In
other cases, compensate when the asset represents a major proportion
of the owner's wealth so that a hypothesis of risk aversion is plausible.
Employ a presumption in favor of risk aversion for individuals and risk
neutrality for publicly held corporations. In addition, compensate even
risk-neutral individuals whose loss represents a large proportion of
their wealth if these individuals are politically ineffective.
To counteract the moral hazard created by compensation, courts
should develop a notion close to mitigation of damages in contract
law.4 5 When government appropriation becomes likely, owners should
be reimbursed only for new investments that either can be used by the
government or would be rational if no compensation were to be paid.
To minimize the private burden of this last provision, courts should
employ a presumption in favor of the private property owner with the
burden of proof on the government to show both that it has given no-
tice and that the investment was excessive.
B. Political Legitimacy and Fairness
Efficiency is not the whole story in analyzing takings doctrine.
When public policies are uncertain and have unpredictable impacts on
small groups in the population, the legitimacy of the state may depend
upon the payment of compensation to mitigate the arbitrary distribu-
tive consequences of many public policies. 46 Citizens whose assets
have been taken are unlikely to be satisfied with the argument that the
system is fair ex ante. Compensation is then a substitute for imposing
severe restrictions on the substance of public policies or the degree of
consent required. Thus, the Court has interpreted the fifth amendment
as designed to prevent
the public from loading upon one individual more than his
just share of the burdens of government, and [it] says that
44. See infra Section IIIB.
45. See Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 496, 483 P. 2d 1,
12, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833, 844 (1971) (landowner not entitled to compensation for "project
enhancement" accruing after it was probable land would be taken).
46. B. Ackerman, supra note 32, 52-53, 68, 79-80; J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust
97-98 (1980); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 605-07\(2d ed. 1988); Michelman,
supra note 22; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 64-65, 75-76 (1964).
1988] 1707
HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1707 1988
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
when he surrenders to the public something more and differ-
ent from that which is exacted from other members of the
public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.47
Similarly, Justice Scalia, in finding that a taking had occurred in Nollan,
argued that even if the California Coastal Commission's policy is
sound, it does not follow that coastal residents "can be compelled to
contribute to its realization.... [I]f [the Commission] wants an ease-
ment across [their] property, it must pay for it."'48
However, the United States Constitution, in permitting policies to
be adopted by majority votes in representative assemblies and ap-
proved by the President, did not contemplate that all statutes would
meet with unanimous approval. Some people would suffer losses while
others benefited. The status quo is not given the deeply privileged po-
sition that it would have under an unanimity rule. Therefore, since
some losses can be imposed constitutionally, the problem for takings
jurisprudence is to decide when an individual has borne more. than his
or her "just share of the burdens of government."149 This is not a ques-
tion that can be answered in this short Article, but it is one that should
be taken up in a self-conscious way by the Court. 50 While a full-fledged
theory of the takings clause cannot be developed here, I can, neverthe-
less, isolate three situations in which compensation should not be paid.
The first situation involves the specification of the property entitle-
ment itself. Compensation should not be paid when the complainant
cannot legitimately claim to be entitled to the benefits that are lost
when the government acts. For example, courts have found that indi-
viduals do not have the right to create a nuisance. Thus, if the state
imposes regulations or confiscates a nuisance, the owner has no right to
claim compensation. Nothing has been taken that the individual had a
right to claim as his own. The classic statement is in Mugler v. Kansas:51
"[A]ll property in this country is held under the implied obligation that
the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."'52 Citing
Mugler with approval, Justice Stevens in Keystone stated that the Court
hesitates "to find a taking when the state merely restrains uses of prop-
erty that are tantamount to public nuisances."53
47. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893),
quoted in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1256
(1987) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
48. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987).
49. Richard Epstein takes a contrary position, reading the takings clause as impos-
ing severe restrictions on the ability of the government to redistribute wealth. See R.
Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985). But see
Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 21 (1986) (criticizing Epstein's
position).
50. Cf. L. Tribe, supra note 46, at 607-13 (discussing the problematic nature of
property in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
51. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
52. Id. at 665.
53. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245 (1987);
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The difficulty with this doctrine is twofold. First, Ronald Coase has
shown that in a two-sided controversy it is not straightforward to decide
who "caused" the harm.54 Second, this doctrine may tie the regulatory
state too closely to doctrines of the common law that may be obsolete
in particular regulatory situations. This compensation rule makes some
types of regulatory programs much more expensive than others. In
practice, however, courts do not seem to have limited themselves to
common-law nuisances. The Mug/er case itself dealt with brewery prop-
erty made valueless by a Kansas constitutional amendment prohibiting
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, and the opinion's lan-
guage is quite broad:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by
individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the
health, the morals, or the safety of the public is not-and, con-
sistently with the existence and safety of organized society can-
not be-burdened with the condition that the State must
compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they
may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a nox-
ious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community.55
Justice Stevens quoted this statement both in his opinion in Keystone 5 6
and in his dissent in First English.57 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
would read the nuisance exception quite narrowly to accord more
closely with common-law doctrine. He has argued that the "nuisance
exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police
power itself." s58 It is instead a "narrow exception allowing the govern-
ment to prevent 'a misuse or illegal use.' "-5 A similar contrast in views
is evident in Nollan. Justice Scalia argued that the state has taken an
"essential stick in the bundle of rights" 60 while Justice Brennan found
that the owners had no legitimate entitlement for the state to take.6'
These different views of the content of legitimate property entitlements
imply that prior to any resolution of the takings issue the Court must
see also id. at 1246 n.22 (citing cases holding that compensation is not required when
the public action abates a public nuisance or stops illegal activity).
54. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960); see also L. Tribe,
supra note 46, at 594 ("Increasingly, deciding who had harmed whom seemed to open a
choice to provide any determinate solution to the question of compensation.") (citation
omitted).
55. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
56. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1244.
57. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2392 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
59. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1256 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Curtin v.
Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
60. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987).
61. Id. at 3158-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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resolve fundamental questions concerning the nature of property.
These questions should be resolved without giving a canonical status to
common-law jurisprudence.
The second situation involves the state's authority to appropriate
excess profits or economic rents. This principle, implicit in antitrust
law,62 provides a justification for the Supreme Court's refusal to find a
taking in Keystone. The Court found that all mines would continue to
operate and that the losses would not be severe.63 This finding, if cor-
rect, implies that the companies were earning excess profits that could
be used to pay for the regulation without causing anyone to go out of
business. This standard also supports Brennan's dissent in Nollan. He
argued that the Nollans "can make no tenable claim that either their
enjoyment of their property or its value is diminished by the public's
ability merely to pass and re-pass a few feet closer to the seawall be-
yond which appellants' house is located."64 Thus, the appellants' claim
could be viewed as an attempt to extract rents from their exclusive con-
trol of a piece of beach needed for convenient access between two pub-
lic beaches. Under this view, they do not deserve compensation
because they have no right to these economic rents. Finally, in Pennell,
the Court reiterated previous decisions finding that the monopoly
power of private business provides a justification for public action that
lowers excess returns. 65
In the third situation, compensation should not be paid if the gov-
ernment action is analogous to a private action that is seen as one of the
risks of economic life. For example, if the government competes with a
private business, this should not produce a takings claim because com-
petitive losses do not give rise to damage claims in the private sector.
These losses, labeled pecuniary externalities by economists, do not
62. The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act both seek to penalize firms that monopo-
lize industries. Instead of compensation, violators may be subject to fines and triple
damages. See F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
494-95 (2d ed. 1980). For another application of this principle, see Rose-Ackerman,
Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1017, 1036
(1982).
63. "We do know, however, that petitioners have never claimed that their mining
operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprofitable since the Subsidence Act
was passed. Nor is there evidence that mining in any specific location ... has been
unprofitable." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
64. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3157 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
65. Pennell v. City of SanJose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 857-58 (1988). The partial dissent
is even clearer on this point:
When excessive rents are forbidden ... landlords as a class become poorer and
tenants as a class (or at least incumbent tenants as a class) become richer. Sin-
gling out landlords to be the transferors may be within our traditional constitu-
tional notions of fairness, because they can plausibly be regarded as the source
or the beneficiary of the high-rent problem.
Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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have the adverse efficiency consequences of externalities that arise
when individuals use scarce resources for which they do not pay. The
distributive consequences produced by market pressures are a cost of
maintaining the incentives needed to make markets work efficiently.
Thus, if the government sells surplus military supplies, it should not
compensate private firms selling competing products. Similarly, the
Tennessee Valley Authority should not have to compensate competing
power companies for lost business. Finally, a regulation that is cheaper
for one firm to comply with than another should not give rise to a com-
pensation claim from the disadvantaged firm.
CONCLUSION
In this brief Article, I have not tried to develop a comprehensive
answer to the takings question. My main message, however, is that
such an effort is sorely needed. While the Court should try for a princi-
pled resolution, this is one legal area in which almost any consistent,
publicly articulated approach is better than none. Clear statement,
even if not backed by clear thinking, will do much to preserve the in-
vestment-backed expectations the Court talks so much about. Clear
thinking would be even better, and here I have provided only a rough
guide. The suggestions based on efficiency, equity and political legiti-
macy outlined above must be supplemented with an understanding of
just what it is that people can be said to own. 66 In attempting to answer
that question, historically generated expectations may need to be pre-
served for the sake of fairness, but they should not straitjacket our
thinking about the future.
66. Epstein claims to present just this kind of clear rule, but he has begged many of
the most important questions. He does this by taking as relatively unproblematic the
issue of how private property should be defined and using a definition that does not
permit concerns with distributive justice to help determine the outlines of property
claims. See R. Epstein, supra note 49, especially ch. 19 at 306-29 and the conclusion at
331-50; Epstein, supra note 25, at 40-41, 44-45.
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